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BOUNDED BY THE CONSTITUTION: RESOLVING THE PRIVATE 
SEARCH DOCTRINE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Mark Kifarkis 
This Article analyzes the private search doctrine exception to the 
Fourth Amendment and the exception's application to smart phones and 
computers. The private search doctrine allows governmental authorities to 
replicate a private individual's search without obtaining a warrant. This 
Article proposes a standard for court's to use to resolve the circuit split on 
how to apply the exception to today's technology. Presently, there are two 
standards used by courts. The Article names one standard as the "boundless 
search approach" that is used by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits. The Article 
names the other standard as "bounded search approach" that is used by Sixth 
and Eleventh Circuits.  The Article proposes courts to use the bounded search 
approach when reviewing matters regarding the private search doctrine, and 
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INTRODUCTION 
The amount of private and personal data that can be stored on a 
smartphone is extraordinary. One of the top-selling smartphones in the world 
has the capacity to hold 81 films, 229 television shows, 19,125 photos, or 
4,080 applications.1 Technology companies understand the amount of per-
sonal data that could be stored on a smartphone and have resisted demands 
from the government to unlock phones of alleged terrorists, due to the 
“chilling” effect such a breach of privacy might have.2 However, a person 
does not need to be in the technology industry to understand the vast amount 
of data a smartphone can hold and the number of uses a smartphone can have. 
In Riley v. California, the United States Supreme Court observed that 
smartphones “could just as easily be called cameras, video players, rolodexes, 
calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or 
newspapers,” and in fact labeled smartphones “minicomputers.”3 Throughout 
the opinion, Chief Justice Roberts describes smartphones as having immense 
storage capacity, where a 16-gigabyte smartphone has the ability to hold 
“millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds of videos.”4 
Having smartphones in the palms of people’s hands has benefited society in 
many aspects of daily life, including business, education, health, and social 
life.5 Because smartphones are such an integral part of our lives, keeping the 
information on those devices private is a great concern.6 
                                                             
1 David Price, What’s the True Formatted Storage Capacity of an iPhone, iPad or iPod?, 
MACWORLD (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.macworld.co.uk/feature/ipad/whats-iphone-ipod-
ipads-true-formatted-storage-capacity-3511773/. 
2 Eric Lichtblau & Katie Benner, Apple Fights Order to Unlock San Bernardino Gunman’s 
iPhone, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/18/technology/ap 
ple-timothy-cook-fbi-san-bernardino.html. 
3 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014). 
4 Id. 
5 Muhammad Sarwar & Tariq Rahim Soomro, Impact of Smartphone’s on Society, 98 EUR. 
J. SCI. RES. 216, 218 (2013). 
6 Id. at 224.  
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Privacy is an issue that many Americans believe is important: they 
believe that they should be able to maintain privacy and confidentiality in the 
commonplace activities of their lives.7 The fear of privacy invasions relating 
to smartphones is significant, considering that nearly 50% of American adults 
own a smartphone.8 Though the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution protects against unreasonable search and seizure,9 the circuits 
are split on how to apply those protections to computers through a concept 
known as the private search doctrine.10 The various court holdings on either 
side of this split can be similarly applied to smartphones. Smartphone 
chipmaker ARM believes that, with their newly announced chips, individuals 
will be able to do all the tasks that currently require a computer. 11 
Considering the downward trend of the PC industry and the continued growth 
of smartphones, it is only a matter of time before smartphones replace 
computers and tablets.12  
Furthermore, the Court in Riley only briefly discussed the technology 
that is known as “cloud computing.” In dicta, Chief Justice Roberts stated 
that “officers searching a phone’s data would not typically know whether the 
information they are viewing was stored locally at the time of the arrest or 
has been pulled from the cloud.”13 The Court went on to compare a search of 
cloud-based storage through a cell phone to “finding a key in a suspect’s 
                                                             
7  Mary Madden & Lee Rainie, Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, Security and 
Surveillance, PEW RES. CTR. (May 20, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/05/20/amer 
icans-attitudes-about-privacy-security-and-surveillance/. In fact, in a 2015 survey, 95% of 
adults stated that being in control of who can get information about them is important and 
74% felt that it was very important. Id. Ninety percent of the adults surveyed that controlling 
what information is collected about them is important and 65% thought it was very important. 
Id. 
8 The Editorial Board, Smartphones and the 4th Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/28/opinion/smartphones-and-the-4th-amendment.html. 
9 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
10 Orin Kerr, 11th Circuit Deepens the Circuit Split on Applying the Private Search Doctrine 
to Computers, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2015/12/02/11th-circuit-deepens-the-circuit-split-on-applying-the-private-
search-doctrine-to-computers/?utm_term=.882a2009d672. 
11 Christina Bonnington, In Less Than Two Years, a Smartphone Could Be Your Only 
Computer, WIRED (Feb. 10, 2015, 3:42 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/02/smartphone-
only-computer/. 
12  Id. Based on the similarities between computers and smartphones, when this Article 
applies a doctrine to computers it also applies the doctrine to smartphones.  
13 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014). 
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pocket and arguing that it allowed law enforcement to unlock and search a 
house.”14 
Applying the Fourth Amendment to society’s advanced technology 
has challenged the courts. 15  Because computers and smartphones have 
similar capabilities and storage, the same standard should be applied to both 
technologies.16 Part I of this Article provides a brief history of the Fourth 
Amendment and the warrantless search exception known as the private search 
doctrine. Part II of this Article discusses the current circuit split between the 
Fifth and Seventh Circuits on one hand and the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits 
on the other, concerning what standard to apply to computers and 
smartphones. Lastly, Part III of this Article offers a resolution to the circuit 
split that presently exists regarding the applicable standards for smartphones 
and computers, by adopting what this Article calls the “bounded search 
approach.” If the courts reject this approach, Part III profits an alternative 
approach to resolving the circuit split that considers the severity of the crime 
to determine which approach should be applied in a given scenario. 
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE 
A. Brief Introduction to the Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides for 
“the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and 
seizures in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.”17 Furthermore, the 
Fourth Amendment requires that warrants shall be issued only upon showing 
probable cause and describing the place to be searched or persons or things 
to be seized.18 The Fourth Amendment has an extensive case law history:19 
in the most seminal case, United States v. Katz, the Supreme Court held that 
                                                             
14 Id.  
15 Kelly A. Borchers, Mission Impossible: Applying Arcane Fourth Amendment Precedent 
to Advanced Cellular Phones, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 223, 225 (2005). 
16 Id. at 257. 
17 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
18 Id.  





8&ud=1&getfields=gsaentity_aba_collection (follow “[MS WORD] A Selection of 
Supreme Court” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).  
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a search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of 
privacy that society considers objectively reasonable.20  This is otherwise 
known as the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test. 21  The test to 
determine whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy has 
two prongs: one that is subjective and one that is objective.22 The subjective 
prong requires a reasonable expectation in the mind of the defendant, while 
the objective prong requires that society must consider the defendant’s 
subjective expectation of privacy to be reasonable. 23  In Katz, the Court 
rejected the notion that only certain physical areas are constitutionally 
protected and established the dual prong reasonable expectation of privacy 
test.24 
Although a warrant is typically required by authorities to perform a 
Fourth Amendment search, certain exceptions allow the government to 
circumvent the warrant requirement.25 In Katz, the Court stated: 
“Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate 
of the (Fourth) Amendment requires adherence to the judicial 
process” . . . and that searches conducted outside the judicial 
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per 
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment–subject only to 
a few specifically established and well delineated 
exceptions.26 
The Court created an exception to this rule in Riley, holding that a warrantless 
search could be permitted through balancing “on the one hand, the degree to 
which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy, and on the other hand, the 
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.”27 Another exception is the third-party doctrine, which states: 
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of 
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to 
[g]overnment authorities, even if the information is revealed 
                                                             
20 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). 
21 Id. 
22 Borchers, supra note 15. 
23 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
24 Michael Wukmer, Comment, The Fourth Amendment Following Private Searches: Is 
There a Privacy Interest to Protect?, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 172, 176–80 (1983). 
25 Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. 
26 Id. (quoting United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951)). 
27 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).  
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on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited 
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not 
be betrayed.28 
Other well-established exceptions, including searches incident to a lawful 
arrest, searches authorized by consent, hot pursuit, plain view observation, 
and customs searches, were created by the Court because the Court 
determined in each case that not all warrantless searches are unreasonable.29 
The private search doctrine should stand amidst these various exceptions. 
B. The Private Search Doctrine 
The protection provided through the Fourth Amendment and the 
Constitution only insulate the public from government actions.30 The Fourth 
Amendment’s “origin and history clearly shows that it was intended as a 
restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to 
be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies.”31 Thus, if a search 
or seizure was carried out by a private citizen who was not acting as an agent 
of the government, the Fourth Amendment would not apply, regardless of the 
unreasonableness of the search.32 
Under the private search doctrine, governmental authorities may 
retrace a private individual’s search without obtaining a warrant33 because 
the owner’s reasonable expectation of privacy has already been breached.34 
The private search doctrine finds its roots in United States v. Jacobsen.35 For 
a search to fall within the private search doctrine the government must 
establish that: (1) the government did not influence the private citizen to 
conduct the search, and (2) the subsequent governmental search did not 
exceed the scope of the private search.36 The Fourth Amendment limitations 
will be fulfilled if the government meets these two elements. The following 
sections analyze each element of the private search doctrine. 
                                                             
28 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
29 Kim A. Lambert, United States v. Jacobsen: Expanded Private Search Doctrine  
Undermining Fourth Amendment Values, 16 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 359, 364–65 (1985).  
30 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
31 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). 
32 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.  
33 United States v. Spicer, 432 F. App’x 522, 523 (6th Cir. 2011). 
34 Andre MacKie-Mason, The Private Search Doctrine After Jones, 126 YALE L.J.F. 326  
(2017), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-private-search-doctrine-after-jones. 
35 Spicer, 432 F. App’x at 523. 
36 Wukmer, supra note 24, at 176–80. 
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1. Governmental influence upon the private search. The first 
prong of the private search doctrine requires a court to determine if the 
government was involved in or influenced the private search.37 In order for 
there to be government influence or involvement, the government authorities 
need not actually be present at the time and place of the citizen’s search.38 No 
bright line test reveals when the government involvement goes too far.39 
Rather, the courts adjudicate Fourth Amendment challenges on a case-by-
case basis, examining the particular facts of each case to determine whether 
government influence necessitates application of the Fourth Amendment.40 
For example, searches conducted by a private person who was encouraged or 
directed by government officials and searches where the private person is 
actually an informant constitute sufficient government influence to implicate 
the Fourth Amendment.41 Two critical factors in assessing whether a private 
party acts as an agent of the government are: (1) the government’s knowledge 
of and acquiescence to the search, and (2) the intent of the party performing 
the search.42 
United States v. Parker provides an example of governmental 
influence that is insufficient to implicate the Fourth Amendment in a private 
search. In Parker, a UPS employee opened a package that was insured for 
$4,000, to ensure it conformed to UPS’s policy for packages insured for more 
than $1,000.43 The UPS employee discovered $4,000 in the case and notified 
the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), which then 
asked UPS to ship the package and notify them of any return package.44 
However, the DEA never inspected the package.45 UPS then informed the 
DEA of a return package and delivered it to the DEA’s office.46 There, a drug 
dog indicated the package contained narcotics.47 The DEA then obtained a 
                                                             
37 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117. 
38 WILLIAM E. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 2:3 (2d ed. 
2017). 
39 United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1045 (11th Cir. 2003). 
40 Id. 
41 Ringel, supra note 38. 
42 United States v. Malbrough, 922 F.2d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. 
Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 657 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
43 United States v. Parker, 32 F.3d 395, 397 (8th Cir. 1994). 
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warrant to open the package and found over 100 grams of 
methamphetamine. 48  On appeal, the defendants argued that UPS was 
operating as an agent of the government when UPS employees cooperated 
with the DEA, since the employees’ actions furthered only the interests of the 
government.49 The DEA countered that no government entity directed UPS 
to open the first package; UPS opened the package pursuant to its own 
company policy.50 The Eighth Circuit sided with the DEA, holding that UPS 
opened the package on their own accord with no influence from the 
government, and the DEA opened the package only after it had obtained a 
search warrant.51 In Parker, the DEA did not go beyond the scope of the 
private search because it did not handle the first package at all, and it did not 
open the second package until it obtained a search warrant. Had the DEA 
opened and searched the second package without obtaining a search warrant, 
it would have expanded the scope of the private search by doing more than 
the employee did, which would have implicated the Fourth Amendment. 
Where the government influences or encourages private parties to 
conduct searches, the searches may fall outside the private search doctrine 
and, thus, be subject to Fourth Amendment protection. Governmental 
influence on a private party defeats the idea that a private search is truly 
conducted by a private party: rather, it is a private party conducting a search 
at the behest of the government. This scenario is evident in Skinner v. Railway 
Labor Executives’ Ass’n. The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 authorized 
the Secretary of Transportation to “prescribe, as necessary, appropriate rules, 
regulations, orders, and standards for all areas of railroad safety,” after data 
revealed that alcohol and drug abuse by railroad employees posed a serious 
threat to public safety. 52  The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) 
subsequently circulated regulations that mandated blood and urine tests of 
employees who were involved in certain train accidents and that authorized, 
but did not require, railroads to administer breath and urine tests to employees 
who violated certain rules.53 
                                                             
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 398. 
50 Id. at 399. 
51 Id.  
52 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 606 (1989).  
53 Id.  
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Skinner required the Supreme Court to determine whether these blood 
and urine test regulations violated the Fourth Amendment.54 The Court held 
that a search is not automatically private if the government has not compelled 
a private party to perform the search.55 In Skinner, the specific features of the 
regulations convinced the Court that the government did more than adopt a 
passive position toward the underlying private conduct by the railroad 
companies. 56  The Court recognized government influence because the 
regulations set forth in Subpart D by the FRA pre-empted state laws, rules, 
or regulations covering the same subject matter and were intended to 
supersede any provision of a collective bargaining agreement or arbitration 
award construing such an agreement.57 Furthermore, the Court found that the 
regulations also conferred upon the FRA the right to receive certain 
biological samples and test results procured by railroads pursuant to Subpart 
D.58 Finally, a railroad could not divest itself of, or otherwise compromise by 
contract, the authority conferred by Subpart D. 59  In light of all these 
provisions, the Court was unwilling to accept the government’s argument that 
the tests conducted by private railroads in reliance on Subpart D were 
primarily the result of private initiative, because the government removed all 
legal barriers to the testing and had made plain not only its strong preference 
for testing, but also its desire to share the fruits of such intrusions.60 
Based upon these two cases, it is clear that the private search doctrine 
applies only when governmental authorities do not influence or compel a 
private citizen to conduct the search on behalf of the government. Essentially, 
if the government has encouraged, endorsed, or participated in any way in a 
search conducted by a private citizen, a court will find that there is enough 
governmental influence to implicate the Fourth Amendment. 
                                                             
54 Id. at 614. 
55 Id. at 615. 
56 Id.  
57 Id. Subpart D authorizes but does not require railroads to administer breath or urine tests 
or both to covered employees who violate certain safety rules. Id. Furthermore, Subpart D 
makes plain a strong preference for testing and a governmental desire to share the fruits of 
such intrusions and the regulation mandates that railroads not bargain away their Subpart D 
testing authority. Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id.  
60 Id.  
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2. Scope of the search. The second prong of the private search 
doctrine requires that the scope of the governmental authority’s search must 
not exceed the scope of the private party’s search. Three cases clearly 
illustrate the contours of this prong. In United States v. Jacobsen, the 
employees of a private freight carrier noticed a white powdery substance that 
was originally concealed within eight layers of wrappings.61 The employees 
called a federal agent, who tested the powder using a chemical test that 
revealed the powder was cocaine.62 The Supreme Court was tasked with 
determining if, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, the agent was required to 
obtain a warrant before he tested the substance.63 The Court held that once a 
private search has been performed, it eradicates the individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.64 Once this happens, “the Fourth Amendment does 
not prohibit governmental use of the now non-private information.” 65 
However, once the governmental authorities conduct their own search, they 
must not exceed the scope of the private search without obtaining a warrant.66 
The second case, Walter v. United States, best illustrates the issue of 
police exceeding the scope of the private search.67 In Walter, employees of 
L’Eggs Products, Inc. opened a dozen cartons of homosexual motion pictures 
that were accidentally shipped to them and found that the individual boxes 
depicted suggestive drawings and explicit descriptions of the contents.68 
After an employee opened one or two of the boxes and attempted to view the 
film, the employees called the FBI. 69  Upon retrieving the packages, the 
agents viewed the films without obtaining a warrant, and the petitioners were 
indicted with obscenity charges.70 
The Court explained that, if the results of the private search are in 
plain view when the materials are turned over to the government, the 
government may justify their re-examination of the materials; however, the 
                                                             
61 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111 (1984). 
62 Id. 
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 117. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 116. 
67 32 LEONARD N. ARNOLD, N.J. PRACTICE SERIES, CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
16:29 (2016–2017 ed.). 
68 Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 651–52 (1980). 
69 Id. at 652. 
70 Id.  
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government may not exceed the scope of the private search unless it has the 
right to make an independent search.71 
In determining whether police officers have exceeded the 
scope of a private search a court should inquire whether the 
government learned something from the police search that it 
could not have learned from the private searcher’s testimony 
and, if so, whether the defendant had a legitimate expectation 
of privacy in that information.72 
The Court found that the government action, viewing the films, was a 
significant expansion of the private party’s initial search because the private 
party had not actually watched the films.73 The Court therefore characterized 
the government viewing the films as a separate search.74 
United States v. Miller further illustrates the private search doctrine’s 
scope requirement. In Miller, an employee at a mental illness treatment 
facility went to the apartment of a patient to give the patient medication, but 
the employee forgot that the patient was out of town.75 Upon entering the 
patient’s room using the master key, the employee smelled cigarette smoke, 
which caused concern because of the facility’s strict no smoking rule.76 The 
employee saw evidence of both cigarette usage and drug activity all lying out 
in plain view, and reported what she saw to the director who then called the 
police.77 Upon responding to the director’s call, police officers observed only 
the evidence that the employee saw.78 Based on the officers’ observations, 
the police obtained a search warrant.79 The defendant appealed, arguing that 
his Fourth Amendment rights were violated; the government countered 
arguing third-party consent overcame the Fourth Amendment issue.80 The 
Eighth Circuit, sua sponte, held that the facility employees’ search 
unquestionably constituted a valid private search.81 Also, the circuit court 
                                                             
71 Id. at 657. 
72 Ringel, supra note 38. 
73 Walter, 447 U.S. at 657. 
74 Id. 
75 United States v. Miller, 152 F.3d 813, 814–15 (8th Cir. 1998). 
76 Id. at 815. 
77 Id.  
78 Id. 
79 Id.  
80 Id.  
81 Id. at 816. 
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held that the police did not participate in or influence the employees’ entry, 
and once the police became involved, their intrusion went no further than the 
private search.82 The fact that the police became involved did not implicate 
the Fourth Amendment in Miller because the police’s intrusion did not 
exceed the scope of the private search conducted by the facility employees. 
It is important to note that there are circumstances where a court is 
unable to determine whether the government agent exceeded the scope of the 
private search.83 In United States v. D’Andrea, a tipster called a child abuse 
hotline and informed the Massachusetts Department of Social Services (DSS) 
that she had received a message on her mobile phone that contained 
photographs of the defendants performing sexual acts on D’Andrea’s eight-
year-old daughter and photos of the daughter’s exposed genitalia. 84  The 
tipster advised DSS how to access the pictures through the mobile phone 
provider’s website.85 DSS agents reported it to the local police department.86 
Upon accessing the website, DSS agents found numerous pornographic 
pictures of D’Andrea’s daughter.87 However, due to the record’s miniscule 
detail surrounding the scope of the private search, the Court lacked sufficient 
evidence to determine whether DSS expanded the scope of the private 
search.88 
These cases show how both prongs of the private search doctrine 
operate. The requirements of no government influence on the private search 
and no government search beyond the scope of the private search provide an 
adequate framework even in our rapidly evolving technological era. The next 
section analyzes the problems of applying the doctrine to smartphones and 
computers. 
  
                                                             
82 Id.  
83 See United States v. D’Andrea, 648 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that “the record [did] 
not provide enough meaningful details on the searches of the websites by the Tipster and the 
DSS, . . .[the court did] not have enough evidence to determine whether the DSS search of 
the website exceeded the scope of the tipster’s search”).  
84 Id. at 3–4. 
85 Id. at 4. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 9. 
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II. THE COURT’S APPLICATION OF THE PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE TO 
SMARTPHONES AND COMPUTERS 
The private search doctrine presents a whole new set of problems 
when it is applied to technology. The primary question that arises is, “when 
a private party searches a computer, sees a suspicious file and reports the 
finding to the police, what kind of government search of the computer counts 
as merely reconstructing the private search and what kind of search counts as 
exceeding the private search?”89 This is a difficult issue to answer because 
the courts face a number of alternatives: “what’s the right measuring unit to 
use – the data, the file, the folder, the physical device, or something else?”90 
An analogous situation exists when the police enter a house: can they search 
everything inside the house or only what is visible? “The opening of any 
closed containers inside the house constitutes a separate search.”91 A “closed 
container” is analogous to a smartphone with multiple photo albums on its 
camera. Each album is a “closed container” and opening the album would 
constitute a new search. Courts battling this issue have developed different 
methods of resolving exactly how much can be searched. Particularly, courts 
have established two types of standards: the single unit approach (hereinafter 
called the “boundless” search approach), and the folder approach (hereinafter 
called the “bounded” search approach).92 
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits apply the boundless search approach 
when governmental authorities search a technological device based on the 
private search doctrine.93 Thus, both circuits reject the idea that each album, 
or folder on a computer, is a closed container that constitutes a new search. 
Instead, these circuits see the device as one container, meaning that one 
search is all that is needed. On the other hand, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits 
apply the bounded search approach when governmental authorities search a 
                                                             
89 Kerr, supra note 10. 
90 Orin Kerr, Sixth Circuit Creates Circuit Split on Private Search Doctrine for Computers, 
WASH. POST (May 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/w 
p/2015/05/20/sixth-circuit-creates-circuit-split-on-private-search-doctrine-for-
computers/?utm_term=.60befdca9a6f. 
91 Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 554 
(2005).  
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device using the private search doctrine.94 The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits 
believe that if authorities want to view a new album on a smartphone, or a 
separate folder on the computer that was not searched by the private search, 
then a warrant is required because the governmental authorities are bounded 
to the scope of the private search. 
A. The Boundless Search Approach 
The boundless search approach, or single unit approach, adopted by 
the Fifth and Seventh Circuits allows governmental authorities to search the 
entire device or computer.95 Hence, the authorities are boundless in their 
search. For example, if a citizen conducts a private search on a smartphone 
and views only one album of photos out of dozens of albums, the boundless 
search approach allows governmental authorities to view the contents of the 
entire smartphone, including all the photos stored in it, not just the one 
specific album the private citizen viewed. Even though the private citizen 
may not have viewed each image that was on the smartphone, the Fifth and 
Seventh Circuits agree that this approach properly balances the governmental 
interest in potential information to be gained from the search with the 
smartphone owner’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the device. 96 
Following this reasoning, these circuits feel that the government’s potential 
ability to gather information outweighs a citizen’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their personal electronics. 
Questions regarding the scope of the government search arise when 
the boundless search approach is adopted. However, even though the 
governmental authorities’ search is more thorough than the private search and 
covers areas that were not viewed by the citizen, the Fifth and Seventh 
Circuits agree that the governmental search does not exceed the scope of the 
private search.97 Accordingly, the search of the entire device complies with 
the Fourth Amendment, under the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ interpretation 
of the private search doctrine. 
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1. Fifth Circuit – United States v. Runyan. Generally, courts 
have agreed that governmental searches, initiated by a private search, of 
computers, smartphones, or other electronic devices must conform to the 
bounded search approach.98 However, the Fifth Circuit adopted the boundless 
search approach for Fourth Amendment purposes to a computer disk 
containing multiple files. 99  The seminal case for the Fifth Circuit that 
established its adoption of the boundless search approach arises from United 
States v. Runyan.100 
In Runyan, the defendant’s ex-wife was retrieving her personal 
property from the defendant’s ranch when she and a companion found 
pornographic photographs they believed to be of a teenager.101 The two also 
removed a computer and various electronic storage devices. 102  Her 
companion then examined several of the storage devices and discovered that 
some contained images of child pornography, leading the companion to 
contact the sheriff’s department.103 Through the course of several weeks, the 
authorities searched additional material from the sources that were turned 
over by the defendant’s ex-wife and her companion—material that was not 
searched in the private searches.104 
On its face, the search that the authorities conducted exceeded the 
scope of the private search that the ex-wife and her companion had originally 
conducted, and thus would violate the Fourth Amendment. But the Fifth 
Circuit took the position that “police do not exceed the private search when 
they examine more items within a closed container than did the private 
searchers.” 105  The closed container was the computer’s hard drive, and 
because the private search exposed some of the files from the container, it left 
the remaining files, which were not viewed during the private search, open to 
further inspection. 106  The court reasoned that the authorities were only 
expanding the prior private search when they opened different files and thus 
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did not exceed the scope of the private search because the search was still 
defined by the physical storage devices.107 The court ruled: 
[P]olice exceed the scope of a prior private search when they 
examine a closed container that was not opened by the private 
searchers unless the police are already substantially certain of 
what is inside that container based on the statements of the 
private searchers, their replication of the private search, and 
their expertise.108 
Based on the authorities’ conversations with the defendant’s ex-wife 
regarding the disks she searched and their contents, the police did not exceed 
the scope of the private search because they were substantially certain what 
the disks contained.109 
However, the court did say the police exceeded the scope of the search 
when they examined disks that the ex-wife and her companion had never 
examined at all. The court stated: 
Any evidence that police obtained from a closed container that 
was unopened by prior private searchers will be suppressed 
unless they can demonstrate to a reviewing court that an 
exception to the exclusionary rule is warranted because they 
were substantially certain of the contents of the container 
before they opened it.110 
Therefore, the court found that “[t]he police could not have concluded with 
substantial certainty that all of the disks contained child pornography based 
on knowledge obtained from the private searchers, information in plain view, 
or their own expertise.”111 Apart from the disks the ex-wife examined, there 
was no evidence as to what the other disks contained (e.g., there were no 
labels or markings on the disks): thus, the police exceeded the scope of the 
private search.112 
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2. Seventh Circuit – Rann v. Atchison. The Seventh Circuit 
agrees with the Fifth Circuit’s position that the boundless search approach 
should apply when authorities search a computer or smartphone.113 The court 
in Rann v. Atchison adopted the Fifth Circuit’s view in Runyan and broadly 
construed the scope of the private search doctrine. 114  In Atchison, the 
defendant’s 15-year-old daughter reported to police that her father, the 
defendant, had both sexually assaulted and taken pornographic pictures of 
her. 115  After being interviewed by the police, she went back home and 
procured a digital camera memory card from her parents’ bedroom and 
provided it to the police, who subsequently downloaded images depicting the 
alleged sexual assault.116 Additionally, the victim’s mother brought the police 
a computer ZIP drive that contained additional pornographic images of the 
defendant’s daughter and stepdaughter.117 The defendant was convicted on 
two counts of sexual assault and one count of possession of child 
pornography.118 On appeal, the court was tasked with resolving whether the 
police went beyond the scope of the private search.119 
The Seventh Circuit took the same view as the Fifth Circuit in Runyan 
and held that, when the private party has searched a single file, the entire 
physical device is subject to being searched by the government without a 
warrant.120 The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Runyan was persuasive to the 
Seventh Circuit, which adopted it because “[a] defendant’s expectation of 
privacy with respect to a container unopened by the private searchers is 
preserved unless the defendant’s expectation of privacy in the contents of the 
container has already been frustrated because the contents were rendered 
obvious by the private search.”121 
Essentially, the test goes back to Katz to determine if the defendant 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the device. In the eyes of the Fifth 
and Seventh Circuits, the defendant fails the objective prong of Katz because 
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the court says there is no reasonable expectation of privacy once a private 
party has searched a file on the device. Thus, even if the party has not 
searched any other files on the device, the search of a single file renders the 
owner’s expectation of privacy in any material on the device unreasonable. It 
is not the subjective prong of Katz that fails, because it is reasonable to argue 
that the defendant would still have a subjective reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the remaining disks or files after one of them has been open. 
In Atchinson, the court held that it was reasonable that the police knew 
the digital media devices contained evidence because both the daughter and 
the mother brought devices to support the sexual assault allegations.122 The 
daughter knew that the defendant has taken pornographic pictures of her and 
brought the police a memory card that contained those pictures, and the 
mother brought a ZIP drive containing pornographic pictures of her daughter 
to support the daughter’s allegations.123 The defendant had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the devices, and therefore, the Fourth Amendment 
does not apply.124 
Thus, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ objective in allowing the 
boundless search approach is to support the governmental authorities in 
obtaining evidence against the defendant by allowing the authorities to search 
the entire device. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ view is that once a private 
search has been conducted on a device, there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in that device any longer, thereby allowing authorities to search the 
entire device. The boundless search approach adopted by the Fifth and 
Seventh Circuits is beneficial to governmental-authority: the gathering of 
potential evidence outweighs any expectation of privacy the owner may have. 
B. The Bounded Search Approach 
The private search doctrine, after Runyan and Atchison, appeared to clearly 
encompass the boundless search approach.125 However, the Sixth and 
Eleventh Circuits did not adopt the boundless search approach; rather, they 
adopted the approach dubbed the bounded search approach. In 2012, the 
Sixth Circuit held that the proper approach was to view the data on the 
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device as separate files rather than a single data unit.126 This approach was 
subsequently adopted by the Eleventh Circuit as well.127 Under the bounded 
search approach, if the private search is performed on a smartphone or 
computer and the private party only opens one specific image or file on the 
device, then the authorities are bound by the private search and can only 
open that one image or file. This is in contrast to the boundless search 
approach, in which there is no question that the authorities would have the 
ability to search the entire smartphone or computer, regardless of which 
files were opened by the private party. 
1. Sixth Circuit – United States v. Lichtenberger. The Sixth 
Circuit case that adopts the bounded search approach is United States v. 
Lichtenberger. In Lichtenberger, the defendant’s girlfriend accessed his 
laptop and began to open different folders, eventually finding child 
pornography.128 She then proceeded to show her mother, and the two viewed 
several more sexually explicit images involving minors before contacting the 
police. 129  Upon arriving at the residence, the police officer asked the 
defendant’s girlfriend to show him the pictures on the laptop.130 She showed 
the officer random photos from several folders.131 The defendant’s girlfriend 
later testified that she was not sure if the pictures she showed to the officer 
were among the same pictures she had seen in her original search.132 The 
court held that the search by the officer, in which he instructed the 
defendant’s girlfriend to go through the computer again, exceeded the scope 
of the initial private search.133 The court held that the officer “must have 
virtual certainty that reproducing the search will not reveal anything the 
[officer] did not already know.”134 Because the defendant’s girlfriend did not 
show the officer the exact same images she already viewed, the court 
reasoned that the officer did not have virtual certainty that he would not have 
seen something unrelated to the child pornography.135 
The defendant argued that the private search was unconstitutional 
because the girlfriend was acting as an agent of the state, and not because the 
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scope of the second search exceeded the original search.136 The Sixth Circuit, 
although agreeing with the district court’s conclusion of suppressing the 
evidence, disagreed with this agency approach.137 There was no question that 
the initial search was private, but the district court erred by determining 
whether the defendant’s girlfriend acted as an agent of the state instead of 
analyzing the scope of the search itself.138 The Sixth Circuit found this to be 
an error, yet still suppressed the evidence because the search exceeded the 
scope of the initial private search.139 
Under the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ approach, the officer’s search 
would have been within the scope of the private search, because the search 
was conducted on the same device as the private search. Thus, even though 
the officer viewed images that the private searcher did not, it would still be 
within the scope of the private search under the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ 
holdings. However, the Sixth Circuit adopted the bounded search approach 
because of the sensitive nature of the computer, in order to protect private 
information by limiting governmental authorities’ ability to perform such 
searches without a warrant. 
2. Eleventh Circuit – United States v. Sparks. In the most recent 
decision on these doctrines, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the bounded search 
approach in United States v. Sparks, bolstering the circuit split by holding 
that law enforcement is limited to viewing files that a private search has 
already viewed.140 Defendants Johnson and Sparks left their cell phone at a 
Wal-Mart store where an employee searched the contents of the password-
less phone and discovered child pornography.141 The employee showed her 
fiancé the images, and he scrolled through the thumbnails and viewed a few 
full size images and a video.142 After their private search, the couple gave the 
phone to police officers, whereupon a Sergeant O’Reilly then viewed the 
thumbnails that the fiancé had viewed, the video that the fiancé viewed, and 
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one additional video that was not viewed in the private search. 143  The 
defendants contended that Sergeant O’Reilly’s warrantless search of the cell 
phone violated their Fourth Amendment rights because he was not within the 
scope of the search that the private citizens conducted.144  
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the defendants and held that the 
search by law enforcement was an illegal search because the officer viewed 
more files than the private search.145 In deciding to adopt the bounded search 
approach, the Eleventh Circuit found that Sergeant O’Reilly’s search was 
within the scope of the private search when O’Reilly viewed the photos and 
video that the couple previously viewed.146 Thus, the Fourth Amendment was 
not violated.147 However, when O’Reilly viewed the second video, which the 
couple never viewed, he exceeded the scope of the private search and violated 
the Fourth Amendment.148 The Eleventh Circuit appeared to be influenced by 
how much information can be stored on the cell phone and the private nature 
of a cell phone. 149  The court even relied on Riley, a non-private search 
doctrine case. 150  The Eleventh Circuit “stressed the intrusiveness of 
searching the personal electronic devices, as does Riley, and [held] that a 
warrantless government search cannot exceed the specified files viewed in a 
prior private search.”151 
In summary, the Eleventh and Sixth Circuits err on the side of privacy 
when it comes to the private search doctrine. On the other hand, the Fifth and 
Seventh Circuits err on the side of law enforcement efficiency when it comes 
to the private search doctrine. Until the United States Supreme Court decides 
to hear a case on the private search doctrine, the circuit split will remain and 
uncertainty will continue as to which method will be adopted by the other 
circuits—the bounded approach or the boundless approach. 
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III. COURTS SHOULD ADOPT THE BOUNDED SEARCH APPROACH WHEN 
REVIEWING MATTERS REGARDING THE PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE 
To resolve the circuit split regarding which approach a court should 
use when applying the private search doctrine, the Supreme Court should 
adopt the bounded approach in order to protect the individual’s privacy. Both 
approaches have their positives and negatives. The boundless approach 
allows authorities to inspect the entire cell phone. The primary positive for 
this approach is that it allows law enforcement to gather additional 
information beyond what is revealed in the private search, thus potentially 
preventing further crimes including, in the extreme case, potential terrorist 
attacks. However, law enforcement is able to gather additional information 
from the entire device at the expense of the owner’s privacy. For example, if 
law enforcement conducts a search based upon the private search doctrine, 
but exceeds the scope of the private search only to find photos of the owner’s 
family, the owner’s privacy has been completely breached with no benefit 
realized by law enforcement. The boundless approach allows law 
enforcement to view all of “the privacies of life” that people store on their 
smartphones.152 Furthermore, exceeding the scope of the private search could 
potentially reveal evidence of an additional crime that is unrelated to the 
search. Typically, a warrant would be required to find such information, but 
the boundless search approach allows law enforcement to search without 
violating the Fourth Amendment. The possibilities of abuse and opportunities 
for law enforcement to entertain a fishing expedition for whatever they can 
find are limitless. 
On the other hand, the bounded approach protects the privacy of the 
individual, particularly in cases where the smartphone does not have any 
additional information related to the crime. Taking the same example that is 
stated above, but using the bounded search approach, law enforcement would 
not be able to access “the privacies of life” that could be contained on a 
smartphone. If law enforcement exceeds the scope of the private search, they 
violate the Fourth Amendment. The bounded approach protects the 
individual’s privacy and, perhaps more importantly, it prevents officers from 
abusing their power and going on a fishing expedition to gather additional 
evidence of new crimes that are unrelated to the private search. As technology 
continues to improve exponentially, there must be a balance between 
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government overreach and privacy rights. One way to prevent government 
overreach is by having the courts uniformly adopt the bounded approach. 
This will protect the individual’s privacy rights when all “the privacies of 
life” are stored on one device. 
A. The Bounded Search Approach Better Protects Privacy in Today’s     
Technological Advancements 
With the advent of cloud-based storage, it has become critical to 
protect information in the cloud from improper law enforcement search: the 
bounded search approach is the only doctrine that does so. Instead of 
accessing information stored on your smartphone or computer’s hard drive, 
cloud computing allows the user to store and access data and programs over 
the Internet.153  In addition, cloud computing allows data from numerous 
devices to be stored in one cloud. Thus, if an individual accesses the cloud 
through the Internet from a smartphone, data that the user stored on the cloud 
from other devices will appear.154 To be clear, this Article does not address 
the third-party doctrine’s application of the Fourth Amendment to cloud 
storage.155 
A typical example of a cloud-based storage system is Google Drive. 
Google Drive gives the user 15 gigabytes of free storage to upload photos, 
drawings, videos, recordings, and essentially any type of data.156  Google 
Drive can be accessed from any smartphone, tablet, or computer. 157 
Therefore, wherever users have access to the Internet, they can access the 
files from their Google Drives. This means that photos uploaded from a 
computer to Google Drive are accessible from a smartphone as long as the 
Google Drive app is downloaded. 158  Therein lies the monumental clash 
between cloud-based storage and the boundless search approach—applying 
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the boundless search approach to devices using cloud-based storage can cause 
disastrous privacy concerns. If a court adopts the boundless search approach, 
law enforcement will be able to search everything on the phone instead of 
merely replicating the private search. If law enforcement accesses the cloud 
on a smartphone, they will have access, not only to what is on the 
smartphone’s hard drive, but to everything that is uploaded to that 
individual’s cloud. This means that law enforcement has within its reach data 
that has been uploaded from a computer at home, a computer at work, or a 
tablet, in addition to the smartphone held by law enforcement. In other words, 
law enforcement would have access to devices that are completely separate 
from the device that was searched by the private search via the cloud 
application that is on that device. 
However, if a court were to adopt the bounded search approach, law 
enforcement would be limited to the scope of the private search. Therefore, 
if the private search only covered the “Photos” album on the owner’s 
smartphone, law enforcement would be strictly bounded to search only that 
“Photos” album. The cloud would be off limits because it would be beyond 
the scope of the private search. Even if the private searcher saw criminal 
activity within the cloud, law enforcement would still be limited to searching 
only the folder that the private searcher viewed. This protects the privacy of 
the smartphone owner because the remainder of his cloud storage is off limits 
to law enforcement. Essentially, the private searcher would need to view all 
the files on that individual’s cloud for law enforcement to be legally allowed 
to search the entire cloud as well. 
The amount of data that can be stored within the cloud is immense. 
Google Drive has 15 gigabytes of free storage, Dropbox has 2 gigabytes of 
free storage, Box has 10 gigabytes of free storage, and OneDrive has 5 
gigabytes of free storage. 159  These are only four of the numerous cloud 
storage providers.160 In addition, all four of these providers also offer paid 
cloud services. Google Drive offers 100 gigabytes for $2 per month or 1 
terabyte for $10 per month and Dropbox offers 1 terabyte for $10 per 
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month.161 Box offers 100 gigabytes for $10 per month and OneDrive offers 
50 gigabytes for $2 per month.162 The amount of data that can be stored with 
these cloud services is practically limitless, particularly with the fee-based 
plans. With as many as 300 million users on Dropbox, 240 million users on 
Google Drive, and 250 million users on OneDrive, it is vital that the privacy 
of these users is protected from the overreach of law enforcement viewing 
data that is unrelated to a private search.163 
B. Alternatively, a Severity of the Crime Approach Should be Adopted 
by Courts When Applying the Private Search Doctrine 
In the event that courts decline to adopt the bounded search approach, 
this Article proposes an alternative test: courts should consider the severity 
of the crime to determine when law enforcement may use the boundless 
search approach. This new test is a good alternative to the bounded search 
approach when it comes to protecting the individual’s privacy. 
For example, if a private searcher goes through another’s smartphone 
and finds a text message and photos of a small amount of marijuana 
(indicating marijuana use or small-scale distribution) the crime is not severe 
enough for law enforcement to use the boundless search approach. On the 
other hand, if a private search of a smartphone reveals legitimate blueprints 
of a terrorist attack, the crime is clearly severe enough to warrant the 
boundless search approach and allow law enforcement to sift through the 
entire smartphone’s contents. 
Admittedly, this test is not without flaws. There is clearly a gray area 
as to what crimes would be severe enough to merit the boundless approach. 
The test is also heavily based on law enforcement’s judgment in deciding if 
the crime meets the requisite severity level. However, this test still protects 
individuals more than completely adopting the boundless search approach. 
The test also balances the government’s interest in protecting society at large 
against government overreach into one’s privacy. The governmental interest 
of protecting society does not justify exceeding the scope of a private search 
of a low-level marijuana dealer’s smartphone. The privacy right protected 
outweighs the harm that is being prevented by exceeding the scope of the 
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search. Furthermore, there are some guidelines that can help determine 
whether crimes meet the severity level to validate a boundless search. For 
example, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, otherwise 
known as the Wiretap Act, prohibits unauthorized interception of wire, oral, 
or electronic communications by government agencies and establishes 
procedures for obtaining warrants to authorize wiretapping by the 
government. 164  However, the Wiretap Act provides an exception to the 
warrant requirement by allowing law enforcement to intercept 
communications if it reasonably determines that an emergency situation 
exists involving activities threatening national security. 165  Similarly, in 
matters as severe as national security, law enforcement should apply the 
boundless search approach to private searches. This provides extensive 
protection of privacy for individuals, because most crimes do not rise to such 
a level. 
Ultimately, however, courts should adopt the bounded search 
approach because it provides the highest protection to the data that is on the 
owner’s device. Specifically, the bounded search approach is best suited for 
technology that includes cloud-based storage. Adopting a pure boundless 
search approach should be avoided at all costs due to the potential abuse by 
law enforcement. Alternatively, if courts do not adopt the bounded search 
approach, they should use the severity of the crime test proposed here to help 
law enforcement determine when it would be reasonable to use the boundless 
search approach. The severity of the crime test may create situations in which 
the boundless search approach is still used, but it protects the owner’s privacy 
in cases where the crime is not sufficiently severe. 
CONCLUSION 
Today’s society is heavily dependent on technology. The rise of 
technology has presented serious problems regarding protection of privacy. 
Currently, law enforcement can circumvent the Fourth Amendment in cases 
where the private search doctrine applies, subject to one of the two 
approaches represented in the current circuit split—the boundless search 
approach and the bounded search approach. Under the boundless search 
approach, the authorities can search the entire smartphone or computer, 
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including cloud storage, once the device is searched privately in any way. 
On the other hand, under the bounded search approach, the authorities can 
only open the specific images or files that the private parties opened during 
their search. In order to protect the “privacies of life” that smartphones hold, 
the bounded approach should be adopted by all remaining circuits or by the 
Supreme Court. Without the bounded search, law enforcement would have 
unlimited access to the individual’s data that may be completely unrelated 
to the private search, whether that data is stored on the smartphone, 
computer, or in the cloud. As an alternative to the bounded search approach, 
courts could use a severity of the crime test to determine when the 
boundless search approach is reasonable, such as for matters of national 
security. The “privacies of life” deserve the highest possible protection and 
that protection can only be provided by the bounded search approach when 
law enforcement circumvents the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement 
through the private search doctrine. 
